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The original goal of Mercosur (or Mercosul in Portuguese) when it was an-
nounced in July of 1990 was the creation of a common market between Argentina
and Brazil by 1995.' The broad, general guidelines for the establishment of
Mercosur were included in ALADI Economic Complementation Accord No. 14
(ACE No. 14), signed in December of 1990.2 Paraguayan and Uruguayan fears
that they would be shut out of a common market between two of their largest
trading partners caused both countries to ask to be included in the Mercosur
process. The end result of this request was the Treaty of Asuncion, signed by
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in the Paraguayan capital on March
26, 1991. 3 The Treaty of Asuncion (the Treaty) was later incorporated into the
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1. Acta de Buenos Aires, 6 de Julio de 1990, 15 INTEGRAcI6N LATINOAMERICANA 67 (Agosto
de 1990).
2. ALADI is the Spanish and Portuguese acronym for the Latin American Integration Associa-
tion, which was formed in 1980 (Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration
Association, Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (1981)) to replace the by then moribund ALALC or
Latin American Free Trade Association founded in 1960 (Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the
Latin American Free Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, 2 M.I.G.O. 1575). All the Spanish-speaking
countries of South America, plus Brazil and Mexico, are members of ALADI. See generally Bevery
M. Carl, The New Approach to Latin American Integration and Its Significance to Private Investors,
2 ICSID (WORLD BANK): FOREIGN INV. L.J. 335 (1987).
3. Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1041 [hereinafter The Treaty of Asuncion].
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ALADI framework as ACE No. 18 in November of 1991, following the Treaty's
near unanimous ratification in the legislatures of all four signatory states.4
Since the signing of the Treaty, the common market aspect of the Mercosur
project appears increasingly elusive. For one thing, Brazil's continuing economic
instability makes it impossible to implement a goal considered crucial by the
Treaty itself, namely coordinated macroeconomic policies among the four mem-
ber states. What is likely to emerge by mid-decade, however, is a Mercosur free
trade zone. 5 Many of the necessary steps for establishing such a free trade zone
have already been taken, and the positive results that this process has already
engendered ensure that progress in this area will continue.6
This article examines the current, multilateral Mercosur integration project
from a legal perspective. Accordingly, the focus is on the Treaty and its effective-
ness for creating an economically integrated Southern Cone by 1995. The earlier
ACE No. 14 is touched upon only insofar as it adds new elements to the Mercosur
process. As it is, the Treaty is superior in most respects to ACE No. 14 in that
it flushes out many undeveloped areas in the earlier, bilateral ACE No. 14, and
the Treaty establishes the institutional bodies intended to oversee implementation
of Mercosur. The provisions of ACE No. 18, in turn, are virtually identical to
the Treaty. Accordingly, all references to the Treaty encompass ACE No. 18,
unless stated otherwise.'
Despite its superiority and the fact that the current Mercosur integration project
is proceeding pursuant to the multilateral Treaty, it is important to emphasize
that the Treaty does not supersede ACE No. 14. Under article 8 of the Treaty
the signatory states specifically preserve their obligations under any previous
ALADI agreement. As a result, Argentina and Brazil retain the right to continue
with the Mercosur process under ACE No. 14 should the multilateral Treaty
prove unworkable. This two-track option has the potential of reducing article 2
of the Treaty, which states that Mercosur is founded upon the mutual reciprocity
4. ALADI-Acuerdo No. 18, 23 de Enero de 1992, 2 PUBLICACIONES 71 (La Plata: Instituto
de Relaciones Internacionales, Diciembre 1992).
5. A free trade zone is the least complicated form of economic integration and involves the
elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade between participating countries. A customs
union adds a common external tariff (CET) on imports from nonunion members, while a common
market also adds a CET and lifts restrictions on the free movement of labor, capital, and services
between the member states and requires some degree of harmonization of national economic policies.
6. These positive results include dramatic increases of intraregional trade. For example, figures
obtained from ALADI show that between 1990 and 1992 total Argentine-Brazilian bilateral trade,
which accounts for 85 % of intra-Mercosur trade, went from an already historically high $2.1 billion
to $4.7 billion. The projection for 1993 is that Argentine-Brazilian bilateral trade will exceed $6
billion.
7. The only substantive difference between the Treaty of Asuncion and ACE No. 18 is that the
latter includes preexisting legal obligations of each Mercosur state to which the Mercosur agreement is
subject. Usually these preexisting obligations are minor (i.e., prohibition on importation of military
hardware), but they also include Argentina's 3% statistical tax (10% since November 1992) levied
on all imports regardless of origin (except Uruguay and, since April 1993, for most items imported
from Paraguay).
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of rights and obligations, to mere rhetorical window dressing. This two-track
option could also conceivably be used to effectively undermine Paraguayan and
Uruguayan veto power in Mercosur's institutional bodies, despite the requirement
of article 16 of the Treaty that all decisions in these bodies must be unanimous.
Paraguayan or Uruguayan intransigence could be countered by an Argentine and
Brazilian decision to proceed with the Mercosur project under ACE No. 14. 8
I. The Mercosur Process and Institutions
Pursuant to article I of the Treaty, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
propose to allow the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production
(that is, capital and workers) between them by the end of a transition period on
December 31, 1994. Such a goal will be accomplished, inter alia, through the
complete elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers. In addition, the Treaty signa-
tories propose to have a common external tariff (CET) in place by the end of
the transition period, as well as coordinated macroeconomic policies. Finally,
article 1 foresees the harmonization of conflicting national legislation by Decem-
ber 31, 1994.
The timetable for gradually eliminating intraregional tariffs to zero by the end
of the transition period are found in Annex No. 1 to the Treaty. Certain goods
exempt from this general tariff reduction schedule are included in special lists
that must be annually reduced by 20 percent so as to be completely eliminated
by December 31, 1994. Because Paraguay and Uruguay joined Mercosur approxi-
mately one year after ACE No. 14 took effect, those nations are given another
year to totally eliminate their lists. The original Argentine list of exempt goods
included 394 items, the Brazilian 324, the Paraguayan 439, and the Uruguayan
list 960.
Annex No. II to the Treaty of Asuncion contains the provisions for determining
the origin of a product, which, in turn, determines whether a good can take
advantage of Mercosur's preferential tariff provisions. In order to receive prefer-
ential treatment a good must be native to or sufficiently transformed within the
Mercosur region so as to achieve a new identity as found in the ALADI tariff
classification system. Extraregional goods that are merely assembled in a Merco-
sur country in a Mexican maquiladora-style operation would not receive preferen-
tial tariff treatment. However, if no more than 50 percent of a finished good's
F.O.B. value does not reflect the C.I.F. price of extraregional components, then
the good will also be entitled to preferential tariff treatment. 9
8. Paraguayan or Uruguayan intransigence is unlikely so long as both countries continue to
view the Mercosur project as necessary for encouraging economic growth, foreign investment, and
international competitiveness.
9. F.O.B. means "Freight on Board" and reflects the price of a good the moment it is placed
on the carrier to be shipped to the buyer. C.I.F. equals "Cost, Insurance, Freight" and reflects the
cost of the good plus insurance and freight charges.
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The Mercosur rules of origin are rather liberal when compared to other regional
integration schemes. For example, in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), passenger automobiles and light trucks will need 62.5 percent North
American content in order to qualify for preferential tariff treatment when the
NAFTA's rules of origin are fully phased in.' 0 In addition, the Mercosur states
are allowed to mutually agree on even more liberal content requirements in the
event of a shortage of regionally produced inputs at internationally competitive
prices or when regionally made inputs do not meet specific technical or quality
specifications.
During the transition period Annex No. IV to the Treaty permits a member
to impose a quantitative restriction on the continued importation of a good from
another Mercosur country when a sudden surge in imports substantially harms
or threatens to harm the importing country's economy." The language in Annex
No. IV makes clear, however, that a quota cannot be imposed when the import
surge is due to the exporter's use of better technology or is a result of a shift in
consumer preference. Instead, the sudden increase must be due to disloyal trading
practices such as subsidized exports or dumping.
The country wishing to impose a quota must first petition the appropriate
Mercosur institutional body. If after twenty days no action is taken on the petition,
then the requesting country can unilaterally impose a quota that can only exclude
the excess above the average amount imported during the preceding three years.
Furthermore, the quota can only be imposed for a maximum of one year, although
it may be extended continuously but not intermittently (that is, a country may
not apply the quota in year one, skip year two, and reapply it in year three).
The inclusion of such a strict safeguard mechanism in the Mercosur process
is intended to avoid the situation that occurred in past Latin American economic
integration schemes where more lax rules were frequently imposed by govern-
ments bowing to powerful local industrialists wishing to protect domestic monopo-
lies from outside competition. The abuse of these clauses was a significant factor
contributing to the eventual stagnation of all these past integration schemes. '
2
In conjunction with article 1 of the Treaty's call for a CET, article 5(c) empha-
sizes that the CET has to be low enough so as to encourage the competitiveness
of the Mercosur countries on the international market. At a meeting held in
Montevideo in December of 1992, the presidents of all four Mercosur countries
10. E. Robert Lewis, Negotiation of NAFTA Text Completed, 21 INT'L LAW NEWS, Fall 1992,
at 5.
11. After December 31, 1994, it is anticipated that fluctuations in trade flows will be handled
by alternative methods that do not require the imposition of quantitative restrictions.
12. The three previous most important prior Latin American economic integration projects in-
cluded the Central American Common Market (CACM) begun in 1960, General Treaty on Central
American Economic Integration (with Annexes), signed at Managua on December 13, 1960, 455
U.N.T.S. 3 (1963); ALALC begun in 1960, which was replaced with ALADI in 1980; and the
Andean Pact started in 1969, Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 1.L.M.
910 (1969). Each of these three projects stagnated far short of the lofty goals initially set for them.
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agreed to establish a flexible, pseudo-CET whereby each member state's individ-
ual external tariff would be no higher than 20 percent by June of 1993. The
presidents agreed to exempt from this 20 percent ceiling a special list of goods
on which higher tariffs of up to 35 percent could be charged, but only through
January 2001. At a presidential summit meeting held in Colonia, Uruguay, in
January 1994, a final agreement on what items will be included in the special
list of exempt items was postponed until the middle of 1994. The difficulty in
establishing this special list has been occasioned by Brazil's desire to protect its
capital goods, computer, and telecommunications industries with tariffs of 35
percent, while Paraguay and Uruguay want zero percent tariffs, and Argentina
will compromise with a 15 percent tariff for such goods.
Article 5(d) calls for the implementation of sectoral complementation
agreements affecting the various industrial sectors of each member state. The
idea is to bring similar industries in the different countries together so that they
either pool their talents and resources in the production of a given good, or
specialize in some aspect of its production. The goal is to produce regional
goods that are competitive on the international market. To date the only sectoral
agreement of importance that has been signed and implemented affects the steel-
making industry. Under article 7 products of one Mercosur country are entitled
to the same type of tax or internal duty treatment accorded to the domestically
produced goods in the other Mercosur countries.
Article 9 of the Treaty establishes the Common Market Council and the Com-
mon Market Group to oversee the administration and implementation of the
Mercosur process during the transition period. The Council is the highest of the
two bodies and is made up of the Ministers of Foreign Relations and Economics
of each member state. The Council issues decisions designed to ensure that the
Mercosur project is implemented on schedule. Article 11 requires that all four
presidents of the Mercosur countries must participate in at least one of the Coun-
cil's meetings every year.
The Common Market Group, the second institutional body, proposes measures
designed to, inter alia, strengthen the integration process and ensure the imple-
mentation of the Council's decisions. The Group is also the Mercosur body to
which a country petitions for authorization to impose a temporary import restric-
tion. The Group is made up of four representatives representing each member
state's respective Ministries of Foreign Relations, Economy (or its equivalent
responsible for Industrial Policy, Foreign Commerce, or economic coordination),
and Central Bank. The Group is assisted by ten working subgroups that strive
to coordinate policies dealing with commercial matters; customs; technical norms;
fiscal and monetary policy as they relate to commerce; surface transport; maritime
transport; industrial and technological policy; agriculture; energy policy; and the
coordination of specific macroeconomic policies. Three new working subgroups
were added in December of 1991 dealing with labor relations, education, and
tourism.
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The fact that the Common Market Council and Group are made up of the same
individuals involved in setting foreign and economic policy in each country helps
to insure that Mercosur will remain an important vehicle for the achievement of
wider policy goals. This is an important difference from previous Latin American
economic integration projects whose institutional bodies were staffed by bureau-
crats whose work soon became irrelevant to the policies actually being pursued
by their home countries.
Another important difference between the institutional bodies of Mercosur and
those of previous Latin American economic integration projects is the emphasis
placed on private sector participation. Article 14 of the Treaty specifically autho-
rizes the Common Market Group to invite private sector representatives to devise
and propose concrete measures to further the integration process. In addition,
specific national sections of the Common Market Group exist, meet frequently,
and include private sector participation as a matter of course. The Argentine
section, for example, meets once a week and maintains close contacts with private
sector groups interested in the progress of Mercosur. 13 The fact that the input
of the private sector is actively sought in Mercosur is recognition of the crucial
role it plays in insuring the success of any type of integration project-particularly
one like Mercosur that depends so much on market forces. This situation is a
far cry from the one that existed in all the previous Latin American economic
integration schemes where the private sector was either excluded from the process
or simply ignored.14
One of the negative features of the Common Market Council and Group,
however, is their lack of supranational authority. Thus, any decision adopted by
the Council or Group must be ratified by each member state's respective legisla-
ture. This procedure is time consuming and prevents quick resolution of the many
asymmetries that currently exist in the laws of the Mercosur countries. These
asymmetries include such things as subsidized electricity or labor regulations
that serve to give a nonmarket competitive advantage to one country over the
others. As mentioned earlier, article 1 called for the harmonization of these
differences before the end of December 31, 1994. The current lack of suprana-
tional authority in Mercosur's institutional bodies makes it impossible to achieve
the harmonization and, therefore, Mercosur's common market goal before 1995.15
13. F. Pefia, Paper Presented at the International Conference entitled "Latin America's Future
in World Trade: Regional vs. World Market Integration" celebrated in Frankfurt, Germany (Mar.
24 & 25, 1992) (unpublished manuscript).
14. See, e.g., ALICIA PUYANA DE PALACIOS, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG UNEQUAL PART-
NERS: THE CASE OF THE ANDEAN GROUP (1982).
15. Important factors limiting the ability to give supranational authority to Mercosur's institutional
bodies are the present constitutional impediments in three of the Mercosur states. Only Paraguay's
constitution accepts the idea of a supranational legal order. Although Brazil and Uruguay's constitu-
tions promote the goal of an integrated Latin America, neither currently provides for the acceptance
of a Mercosur community law. For its part, Argentina's present constitution recognizes only the
distribution of law-making powers between the federal government in Buenos Aires and the provinces.
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Article 15 of the Treaty of Asuncion sets up an administrative secretariat
in Montevideo to coordinate meetings, issue press releases, and handle public
relations. In this regard it should be pointed out that, by falling within the ALADI
framework, the Mercosur process has at its disposal the ALADI administrative
and bureaucratic organs, which are also headquartered in the Uruguayan capital.
To date, the Mercosur countries have preferred to use their own institutional
framework. 16 The one major exception to this avoidance of ALADI institutions
is in the utilization of the ALADI central clearing house mechanism. By this
mechanism private sector transactions are channelled through the main clearing
agent, Peru's Central Reserve Bank in Lima, and dollar payments are only re-
quired to cancel balances remaining at the end of every four month period. Daily
gaps between credits and debits are financed by bilateral credit lines, also settled at
the end of every four months. All eleven members of ALADI plus the Dominican
Republic participate in this clearing house mechanism.
Annex No. III to the Treaty established a temporary system for the resolution
of controversies that might arise among the member states concerning their obliga-
tions under the Treaty. In December of 1991 the four Mercosur presidents signed
the Protocol of Brasilia. 17 The Protocol spells out the definitive rules for resolving
disputes among the member states with respect to interpretation of, application
of, and failure to adhere to obligations arising under the Treaty of Asuncion and
decisions and resolutions of the Common Market Council and Group. The Proto-
col was subsequently ratified by the legislatures of all four Mercosur countries
and entered into force in April of 1993.
The Protocol of Brasilia requires that the state parties to a dispute first try to
resolve their differences among themselves through direct negotiations. If a solu-
tion cannot be obtained, then the matter is to be referred to the Common Market
Group, which may seek outside expert advice in rendering a decision. If the
Group is unable to make a decision within thirty days, then the matter is referred
to a three-member arbitration panel. The arbitrators have a maximum of ninety
days within which to render a judgment, and their decision is not appealable.
The vote is confidential, and no dissenting opinions to a judgment are permitted.
The losing party has thirty days within which to obey the arbitrators' judgment.
See, e.g. , Beltran Gambier, El Mercosur Frente a Su Asignatura Pendiente: La Constituci6n Nacional,
COMMUNITAS 16 (1993); Diego Carlos Sanchez, El Derecho Ambiental en el Desarollo y Medio
Ambiente en las Americas 4-6 (Feb. 2, 1993) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the XXX Confer-
ence of the Inter-American Bar Association, Santiago, Chile, April 1993). Accordingly, amendments
to the present constitutions of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay would be required in order to give
Mercosur's institutional bodies supranational authority.
16. Many have pointed out that the only reason why the Treaty was incorporated into the ALADI
framework in the first place was to avoid the reporting requirements of article 24 of the GATT. All
the Mercosur countries are GATT members.
17. Protocolo de Brasilia Para la Soluci6n de Controversias, Dec. 17, 1991, 6 INTER-AMERICAN
LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1992).
SUMMER 1994
446 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Failure to comply permits the other parties to the dispute to temporarily adopt
appropriate compensatory measures.
Individuals detrimentally affected by a law adopted by a member state violative
of its Mercosur obligations can file a complaint with the National Section of the
Common Market Group wherein they reside or are headquartered. If the complaint
cannot be resolved within fifteen days, it is then referred to the full Common
Market Group, which has thirty days within which to resolve the complaint.
Unlike a state party, however, an individual has no further recourse beyond the
Common Market Group unless a state party adopts the individual's complaint
and requests arbitration. In addition, an individual may not directly challenge a
state's failure to adhere to its Mercosur obligations. This specific limitation con-
trasts with the situation in the EEC, for example, where individuals who meet
the standing requirements can directly challenge a state's failure to adhere to
obligations arising under the Treaty of Rome. Interestingly, individuals enjoyed
a similar right in the Andean Pact. Many legal scholars in the Mercosur countries
have criticized the fact that an individual cannot challenge the decisions of the
Common Market Group or Council, even if these decisions directly affect that
individual. 18 At present this problem is more academic than real considering the
Mercosur institutional bodies' current lack of supranational authority. However,
should this situation ever change, this limitation is a serious infringement on
individual rights, particularly if a state's national courts are without jurisdiction
to hear cases challenging international legal obligations.
Other criticisms that have been levelled at Mercosur's conflict resolution mech-
anism are that the decisions are confidential and that no dissenting opinions are
permitted. In particular, the confidentiality requirement prevents the establish-
ment of a body of Mercosur law that can provide a helpful, interpretive guide
for others who might find themselves in similar predicaments in the future.' 9
The rule against dissenting opinions is criticized because it goes against the
standard practice of arbitration clauses found in other international treaties.2"
Pursuant to article 20 of the Treaty of Asuncion, any ALADI member wishing
to join Mercosur will be permitted to do so after 1995. If that ALADI member
is not already a member of a subregional group such as the Andean Pact, for
example, then a request for membership may be considered beforehand. Interest-
ingly, the accession provision in ACE No. 18 is much more permissive than
article 20 of the Treaty in that the former permits any other ALADI members
to join Mercosur subject only to prior negotiations among Mercosur's original
member states.
Under article 21 of the Treaty any state wishing to withdraw from Mercosur
18. See, e.g., Rodolfo R. Geneyro, El Mercosur: Una Transici6n Jurldica Compleja, 2 PUBta-
CACIONES 11, 19 (La Plata: Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales, Diciembre 1992).
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id. at 19.
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may do so upon sixty days' written notice to the remaining members. However,
article 22 requires the withdrawing state to adhere to the Treaty's trade liberaliza-
tion program for another two years after the withdrawal request becomes effec-
tive.
Finally, article 24 of the Treaty imposes an obligation on the executive branch
in each Mercosur country to keep their legislative branches abreast of progress
in the Mercosur project.
Although no mention is made to them in either the Treaty or ACE No. 18,
four programs that originated in the Argentine-Brazilian Program for Integration
and Economic Cooperation (better known by its Spanish and Portuguese acronym
PICAB) are carried over into the Mercosur project through ACE No. 14. The
PICAB was started by then Presidents Raul Alfonsin of Argentina and Jose Sarney
of Brazil in 1986 and gradually opened up specific sectors in Argentina and Brazil
to bilateral free trade.2' These four programs affect the capital goods, processed
foods, automobile, and nuclear power industries. In the case of capital goods,
processed foods, and products intended for use in each country's nuclear power
plants, specific items are included in specially negotiated "common" lists which
are traded between Argentina and Brazil free of tariffs. In the case of the automo-
bile industries, Argentina and Brazil committed themselves to purchasing a speci-
fied number of cars, trucks, and spare parts from each other every year. In
1991, for example, each country was supposed to buy 10,000 passenger vehicles
(including jeeps and small trucks) from the other and a maximum of $600 million
worth of autoparts included in a common list. A new agreement signed by Argen-
tina and Brazil on August 23, 1991, increased the automobile quota to 18,000
vehicles for each country, and in 1992 the goal was set at 25,000 vehicles each.
At a meeting between the Argentine-Brazilian heads of state in Buenos Aires on
May 24-25, 1993, the quota for 1993 was reduced to 20,000 passenger vehicles
in recognition of Argentina's inability to meet either its 1991 or 1992 quotas.
Much of Argentina's export problem has been attributed to sharply increasing
domestic demand, which leaves the Argentine automobile industry with few sur-
plus vehicles to export.22
II. Conclusion
Brazil's continuing economic instability makes it impossible to coordinate mac-
roeconomic policies among the four Mercosur countries and therefore sharply
diminishes the chances for a common market in South America's Southern Cone
by 1995. In addition, the Common Market Council and Group's present lack of
supranational authority makes it impossible to resolve before 1995 the many
21. Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Integration, July 29, 1986, 27 I.L.M. 901 (1988).
22. Argentina: Trade & Industry, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Mar. 4, 1993, at 99. Less kind
commentators have attributed Argentina's inability to meet its automobile quotas to the fact that
Argentine cars tend to be more expensive and of poorer quality than comparable Brazilian models.
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differences in the domestic laws of each member state, which must be done in
order to establish a common market.
Although a common market will not emerge by mid-decade, what will appear
by Mercosur's original target date of 1995 is a fully functioning free trade zone
with a modified CET. In that regard, Mercosur's present legal and institutional
framework appears adequate to sustain the formation of a viable free trade zone
by 1995.
That there will be a Mercosur free trade zone by 1995 is facilitated by a number
of factors. First, the tariff reduction schedule and accompanying reduction in
the number of exempt items have been implemented according to schedule. The
positive results these measures have already brought in terms of dramatic increases
in intraregional trade flows, new jobs, and new business opportunities helps to
insure that future tariff reductions will be enacted according to the timetable.
Secondly, the free market oriented policies being pursued in each Mercosur
country support and complement the overall goals being sought through a regional
free trade zone. Finally, the creation of strong regional trading blocs in other
parts of the world require the Mercosur countries to form their own negotiating
bloc if they are to escape economic marginalization in this new world order.
A Mercosur free trade zone by 1995, although falling short of the original
common market goal, would be a huge success in view of Latin America's
previous dismal track record at economic integration. Such a free trade zone
would provide both regional and extraregional investors with a wealth of new
opportunities.23 Once a free trade zone is established in South America's Southern
Cone, it will then make Mercosur's original common market goal imminently
more attainable sometime early in the next century.
23. For multinational companies already operating in the region, the Mercosur free trade zone
allows them to streamline operations and redirect production to the most cost-efficient plants that
can serve the entire 200 million person regional market from one location. Companies new to the
region can, in turn, select the Mercosur country that provides them with the most comparative
advantages to set up a manufacturing plant or service facility and then use it as a spring board into
the other Mercosur members.
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